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ABSTRACT: A recent interest for the empirical observation of argumentation through institutional 
practices was underlined by van Eemeren (2010). Since discourses give empirical hints which inform the 
observer on the institutional conventionalized practices involved in the study of strategic manoeuvring, 
there must be ways of describing meaning which allows to account for the dynamics of this field: a study of 
these ways is the object of this paper.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Research in argumentation has acknowledged the important role of discourse in the study 
of argumentative strategies and manoeuvring. This acknowledgement is not recent; 
however, more recent is the inclusion, within the possible objects of research on 
argumentation, of the relationship between institutional contexts and argumentative 
discourse, via conventionalized institutional practices. The recent interest for the 
empirical observation of argumentation through institutional practices was underlined by 
van Eemeren (2010, p. 129) in these terms: 
 
… the term argumentation [… also refers to] an empirical phenomenon that can be observed in a 
multitude of communicative practices which are recognized as such by the arguers. Because these 
communicative practices are generally connected with specific kinds of institutional contexts […] 
they have become conventionalized. Due to this context-dependency of communicative practices, 
the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse in such practices are in some 
respects determined by the institutional preconditions prevailing in the communicative practice 
concerned.  
 
This new interest for an empirical approach to the relationship between institutional 
contexts and argumentative strategies, via communicative practices linked to institutional 
preconditions, opens a wide and important field of research, as van Eemeren 
convincingly shows it in his 2010 book.  
As van Eemeren pointed out, the empirical study of this multidimensional space is 
possible because, among other reasons, all the terms of these relations are, at least 
partially, observable through discourse. Since discourse gives empirical hints to grasp the 
different facets of this space, it may be argued that there may be a way of describing 
 meaning, which would allow to account, at lest partially, for the dynamics of those 
relations: this would provide a sort of shortcut to the description of argumentative 
strategies, as they are partially in-formed by the institutions. Obviously, such a shortcut 
lives aside an enormous part of the field opened by the abovementioned remarks. 
Nevertheless, for one who is ‘only’ interested in a better description of the semantics of 
natural languages, it offers interesting and rich perspectives. 
This is what this paper is intended to show. We will also see that this shortcut is 
not a completely new idea in semantics: I will examine how several ideas borrowed from 
the paradigm of Argumentation Within Language can be adapted to an empirical study of 
the relationship between argumentation and the institutional constraints. Finally, I defend 
the idea that this shortcut is useful also for the one who is engaged in the complete study 
of the field: since most of what is observable in that field is discourse, it may be useful to 
make explicit the reasoning which compels to describe the institutional conventions the 
way we do. A rigorous semantic description is more than useful for this purpose. 
Among the various ways of describing meaning that might meet those 
requirements, I emphasize the interest of several aspects of the so called “View-Point 
Semantics” (VPS), partially inspired by Mikhaïl Bakhtin’s work on the “inhabited” 
character of natural language words (see, for instance, Bakhtin (1929, p. 279), as well as 
by Oswald Ducrot’s work on the semantic constraints on argumentative orientation and 
strength (see, for instance, Ducrot (1988)). In particular, I insist on the technique it 
provides for, so to speak, extracting ideological and cultural preconditions from 
discourses, which inform the observer on the institutional conventionalized practices. 
 
 
2. FROM STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING TO SEMANTICS  
    (through the route of empiricity…) 
 
The field of research opened by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2009) and further 
investigated by van Eemeren (2010) includes, among other, the study of the multi- 
dimensional space of relationships between the different kinds of institutional contexts, 
the different types of institutionalized purposes, the different aspects of conventionalized 
communicative practices, the different aspects of communicative activities, and the 
different types of argumentative strategies. As for the parameters that must be taken into 
account in order to investigate that field, van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2009, p. 11) 
circumscribe them in this way: 
 
 In analyzing the strategic function of the maneuvering that is carried out by making a particular 
argumentative move, the following parameters need to be considered: 
1. the results that can be achieved by the manoeuvring; 
2. the routes that can be taken to achieve these results; 
3. the constraints imposed by the institutional context; 
4. the commitments defining the argumentative situation 
 
Following van Eemeren and Houtlosser (and one really wants to follow them –at least on 
those points), what we have to observe are things like results, routes, constraints and 
commitments. Moreover, in agreement with one of the cornerstones of pragma-dialectical 
theories, the empirical study of that field is possible because those ‘ingredients’ are 
observable through discourse. Finally, as van Eemeren insisted in his introductory lecture 
 at ISSA 2014, the study of strategic manoeuvring must be contextualized, empirical and 
as formal as possible. 
We will see how an empirical semantics of human languages can do the job and 
collect and organize observational data for a study of strategic manoeuvring that would 
meet the requirements proposed by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2009). 
 
2.1. Empirical observation for strategic manoeuvring and semantics 
 
From the three theses I underlined (the ingredients, the observability through discourse, 
and the three desired properties of the study) it follows there must be a way of describing 
meaning which accounts for how utterances inform with respect to results, routes, 
constraints and commitments. 
The claim is stronger than what it first appears: the term meaning is used here in a 
technical sense, where it refers to the semantic value of languages units, independently of 
the situation in which they are used; as opposed to the term sense, (utterance meaning), 
which we use to refer to the semantic value of utterances in situations. 
The reason why that claim has to be acceptable is that the only observable facts 
that lead a hearer, in a given situation, to reach a particular result, route, constraint or 
commitment, rather than others, are the linguistic units used in the utterance. Obviously, 
in other situations, the same linguistic units might (and will) lead the hearer to reach other 
results, etc., so that the study of strategic manoeuvring really has to be contextualized, in 
spite of that claim. But, given that in each particular situation, it is the choice of some 
linguistic unit rather than some other that produce some effect rather than some other, in 
order to carry an empirical study, it must be acknowledged that a set of instructions 
which is stable with respect to situations, must be given by the language units which are 
used in the discourse. Acknowledging this allows to meet the last requirement underlined 
by van Eemeren: having the study of strategic manoeuvring supported by semantic 
descriptions (i.e. independent of context), is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition 
for a possible formal study. 
 
2.2. Empirical observation in general 
 
From a more general perspective, I will now address two essential aspects of empirical 
observation: causality and subjectivity. This will help understand (a) why and how, in 
spite of the fact that causal relations are not accessible to our sensorial system, they play 
an essential role in empirical sciences, and (b) why and how, in spite of the necessary 
radical subjectivity of individual observation, a certain degree of constructed objectivity 
can be achieved within a community. 
a) Causality 
Empirical observation concerning the parameters underlined by van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser can be expressed by (meta-)statements of the form: 
The linguistic segment X used in the institutional situation S 
produced the effect R, with respect to parameter P. 
As can be seen by the reference to produced effects, these (meta-)statements convey 
implicit causal attributions. This is not specific to the field of strategic manoeuvring, nor 
to that of argumentation, and not even to linguistics or any human or social science: 
 indeed, any scientific observational statement, like, for instance, “water boils at 100° C”, 
carry implicit causal attributions; in our last example, if we try to substitute “43 years 
old” to “100° C”, we immediately understand that the original statement conveys the 
implicit causal assumption according to which the cause of the boiling is the temperature 
(and not the age of the technician…). 
Now, no scientist and no thinking human being in general would ever pretend 
they have observed some causal relation with their sensorial apparatus: causal relations 
are not observable through our sensorial apparatus and causality is always only a 
hypothesis. Obviously, some causal attributions are more plausible than others, but 
plausibility is not a proof... 
Acknowledging that causal relations are not directly observable through our 
sensorial apparatus does not imply believing that causality doesn’t exist, but only 
understanding that causal statements cannot be used as empirical evidences 
And, since we have just seen that all scientific empirical observational statements 
convey an implicit causal attribution, it follows that no scientific empirical observational 
statement can be directly used as an evidence for some theoretical standpoint. This may 
seem paradoxical, but it is not so. The same idea can be reformulated in another way, 
which shows an exit to that apparent paradox: ‘any statement about the world, which 
evokes a causal relation between facts of the world, refers to non directly observable 
facts’. The apparent paradox dissolves itself as soon as we abandon the naïve belief that 
only material things really exist for science, belief which entails that only direct 
observation can count as an evidence. This is why sciences, and especially ‘hard’ 
sciences have developed a very sophisticated system of indirect observation, including 
criteria of validity for the causal attributions supposed by that indirect observation.  
b) Objectivity and intersubjectivity 
Since scientific statements suppose previous causal attribution hypotheses, our 
perception of the world is significantly influenced by our theoretical biases. 
Again, acknowledging that our beliefs about the existence of what we perceive 
cannot be invoked as a proof of its existence is something different from believing that 
those beliefs are false. And, in the same way, acknowledging that the way we perceive 
the world is influenced by our theoretical biases is something different from believing that 
the world plays no role in the way we perceive it. 
Roughly, the essential reason for that difference is that, though we cannot directly 
access the world (we can only access it through the individual interpretation of what our 
sensorial apparatus gives), the world accesses our actions and reacts to them. Thus, 
analyzing what is stable in different selected human actions and in the world reactions to 
them may give us collective stable elements to make hypotheses about how the world is 
within that zone of stability. 
In Raccah (2005), I showed that an essential scientificity requirement, valid for 
any kind of science, is that it should provide descriptions of a class of phenomena, in 
such a way that the descriptions of some of those phenomena provided de dicto 
explanations for the descriptions of other ones. I also pointed out that fulfilling empiricity 
requirements could not lead to believe that science describes the phenomena ‘the way 
they are’, since one cannot seriously believe that there is a possibility, for any human 
being, to know the way things are. Though scientific observers cannot prevail themselves 
of knowing how the world is, they have access to the world through their interpretation of 
 the states of their sensorial apparatus: that interpretation often relies on previously 
admitted scientific – or non scientific – theories. 
If we want to apply these requirements to semantic theories, we have to find 
observable semantic facts, which can be accessed to through our senses. As we will see in 
the next section, it seems that we are faced with a big difficulty, which might force us to 
admit that there cannot be such a thing as an empirical semantic theory: we will see that 
semantic facts are abstract and thus not directly accessible to our sensorial apparatus. We 
seem to be in a situation in which the very object about which we want to construct an 
empirical science prevents its study from being an empirical study… 
However, if we admit that physics is a good example of empirical sciences, we 
should realize that we are not in such a dramatic situation. For what the physicist can 
observe through her/his senses, say, the actual movements of the pendulum (s)he just 
built, is not what her/his theory is about (in that case, the virtual movements of any –
 existing or non existing – pendulum): the object of physical theories is not more directly 
accessible to the observers’ sensorial apparatus than the object of semantic theories. 
Physicists use different tricks in order to overcome that difficulty, one of which is the use 
of indirect observation: some directly observable
1
 entities are considered to be traces of 
non directly observable objects or events, which, in some cases, are seen as one of their 
causes, and, in other cases, as one of their effects. 
If we are willing to keep considering physics as an empirical science, we are 
bound to consider that that indirect observation strategy is not misleading; we only have 
to see how it could be applied to the study of meaning. In order to illustrate how this 
could be done, I will examine an example and will abstract from it. 
 
2.3. Empiricity in what concerns the study of human languages semantics 
 
Now that we have been reminded that (i) causality is not directly observable, (ii) 
scientific empirical statements of observations suppose causal attributions, (iii) sciences 
speak of indirectly observable entities embedding relations between directly observable 
entities, I would like to elaborate on a few interesting properties of the causal attributions 
used within the sciences of language(s), and, in particular, semantics. This will help 
understand why semantics can be a shortcut for strategic manoeuvring.  
 
2.3.1. A few conceptual distinctions 
 
The concepts I resort to for this study are not all used in a normalized way: in the 
intent to be understood by different trends of thoughts, I will first insist on several 
conceptual differences (it should be noted that the terms I used do refer to these concepts 
may very well not be the ones some or other reader would use. I do not mean to compel 
them to use the same terms I use rather than the ones they prefer: I only aim at 
characterizing the concepts and insist on their differences. 
a) Several concepts of language 
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 Though I have shown (ibid.) that nothing can be directly observable by a human being (since anything 
requires the interpretation of the state of our sensorial apparatus), I will use that expression to refer to 
objects or events whose access is granted by the interpretation of the effect they directly produce on our 
sensorial apparatus. This terminological sloppiness is introduced for the sake of legibility… 
 Though it is unavoidable that notions which are deeply related to our ways of thinking are 
grasped in different manners, according to the differences in those ways of thinking, it is 
avoidable, and highly desirable (see Pascal 1655, pp. 523-535) to ascertain that these 
conceptions are about the same concept. In the case of language, the differences in 
conceptions are frequently altered by an abusive assimilation of three distinct concepts: 
(i) something that human beings speak (or write) in, that is usually acquired by all human 
beings between birth and 24 months, that may serve to communicate, to think, to deceive, 
etc., that may be different from one group of human beings to another, that may be learnt, 
taught, etc.; English, French, Spanish, etc. are different instances of this something, which 
is called “idioma” in Spanish, “langue” in French; the noun referring to it may be 
pluralized;  
(ii) the faculty that human beings have (some people may believe that it is also the case 
for some animals, robots, gods, etc.), and that enables them to learn, use and possibly 
forget the something I coined as the first concept; this second object is called “lenguaje” 
in Spanish, “langage”, in French; the noun referring to it cannot be pluralized;  
(iii) an abstract system, consciously and deliberately built by a human being, or by a team 
of human beings, in order to achieve a specific goal or set of goals.  
The fact that these three different concepts happen to be called, in English, by the 
same name is not an evidence for their being the same concept… To avoid such 
confusions, I will use the term human languages for concept (i), Language Faculty, for 
concept (ii), and artificial language, for concept (iii). 
b) Several concepts of meaning 
The difference between a sign and its use in a particular situation is acknowledged by 
most linguists. However, one of its consequences on the study of semantics and 
pragmatics, namely the essential difference in nature between utterance meaning and 
sentence meaning, is not so often taken into account
2
. 
In order to fully understand the rest of this paper, it will be necessary to keep this 
difference in mind: I will speak of utterance meaning in order to refer to the result of 
some interpretation of a discourse or of an utterance in a particular situation; in contrast, I 
will speak of sentence meaning in order to refer to the contribution of language units (not 
only grammatical sentences) to the interpretation of their different possible utterances. 
Note that this apparently ‘neutral’ terminology presupposes that each unit of any 
language has something stable which is partially responsible for the infinitely many 
possible interpretations its use may lead to
3
. 
 
2.3.2. Instructional semantics 
 
Semantics can thus be conceived of as the discipline which empirically and 
scientifically studies the contribution of language units (simple or complex) to the 
construction of the meanings of their utterances in each situation. The contribution of the 
                                                        
2 As far as I know, one of the first explicit modern presentation of the conceptual difference between 
utterance meaning and sentence meaning is due to Dascal (1983). 
3  This  very  strong  claim  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  any  dunce  can  acquire,  and  does  acquire,  a 
human language in 18‐24 months, being exposed only to speech and human attitudes 
 situations to the construction of utterance-meanings is studied, according to that 
conception, by pragmatics. 
According to that conception of semantics, utterance-meaning is, clearly, the 
result of a construction achieved by some hearer, construction influenced by the linguistic 
meaning (sentence-meaning, phrase-meaning) of the language units used in the utterance 
and by the elements of situation taken into account by the hearer. Diagram 1 illustrates 
this conception: 
 
 
Diagram 1: The determination of utterance-meaning by sentence-meaning and situation 
 
This pre-theoretic way of understanding the canvas of utterance-meaning construction 
belongs to the instructional semantics trend, as presented, for instance, in Harder (1990, 
p. 41): 
 
the emphasis is on meaning as something the speaker tells the addressee to do. If A (the addressee) 
does as he is told (follows the instructions), he will work out the interpretation that is the product 
of an act of communication 
 
2.3.3. Causal attributions in semantics, and their essential properties 
 
Suppose an extra-terrestrial intelligence, ETI, wanted to study the semantics of English 
and, for that purpose, decided to observe speech situations. Suppose ETI hides in a room 
where several – supposedly English speaking – human beings are gathered, a classroom, 
for instance. Suppose now that ETI perceives that John pronounces “It is cold in here”. If 
all of ETI’s observations are of that kind, there is no chance that it can formulate 
grounded hypotheses about the meaning of the sequence it heard. For what can be 
perceived of John’s utterance is only a series of vibrations, which, in themselves, do not 
give cues of any kind as to what it can mean (except for those who understand English 
and interpret the utterance using their private know-how). If ETI wants to do its job 
correctly, it will have to use, in addition, observations of another kind. Intentional states 
are ruled out since they are not directly accessible to the observers’ sensorial apparatus. It 
follows that we will have to reject any statement of the kind: “the speaker meant so and 
so”, or “normally when someone says XYZ, he or she wants to convey this or that idea” 
 or even (in case the observer understands English) “I, observer, interpret XYZ in such 
and such a way and therefore, that is the meaning of XYZ”. ETI will have to observe the 
audience’s behaviour and see whether, in that behaviour, it can find a plausible effect of 
John’s utterance: it will have to use indirect observation. The fact that it may be the case 
that no observable reaction followed John’s utterance does not constitute an objection to 
the indirect observation method: it would simply mean that ETI would have to plan other 
experiments. After all, even in physics, many experiments do not inform the theorists 
until they find the experimental constraints that work. 
Before we go further, let me insist and emphasize that we have just seen that the 
different ‘popular learned conceptions’
4
 of semantics are wrong. Indeed, the observable 
phenomena of semantics (i) cannot be directly meanings, since these are not accessible to 
our sensorial apparatus; (ii) they are not just utterances, since that would not be enough 
to describe meaning phenomena; (iii) they are not pairs consisting of utterances and 
‘intended meanings’, since such intentional things are not accessible to empirical 
observation. In our extra-terrestrial example, we suggested that they are pairs consisting 
of utterances and behaviours. 
I will take that suggestion as seriously as possible: in the rest of this section, I 
examine how to constrain the relationship between utterances and behaviours, and sketch 
some of the consequences of this choice. 
a) The causal attribution hypothesis 
Suppose that, in our example, ETI notices that, after John’s utterance, the 
following three actions take place: (i) Peter scratches his head, (ii) Paul closes the 
window and (iii) Mary writes something on a piece of paper. We all know (actually, we 
think we know, but we only believe…) that the correct answer to the question “what 
action was caused by John’s utterance?” is most probably “Paul’s”. However, ETI has no 
grounds to know it and, in addition, it may be the case that Paul closed the window not 
because of John’s utterance (which he may even not have heard), but because he was 
cold, or because there was too much noise outside to hear what John was saying… 
Obviously, the most plausible hypothesis, in normal situations, is the one according to 
which Paul’s action was caused by John’s utterance; but the fact that it is plausible does 
not make it cease to be a hypothesis… 
Thus, before ETI can continue its study, it must admit the following general 
hypothesis 
H0: Utterances may cause behaviours 
Moreover, in each experimental situation s, ETI must make specific hypotheses hS which 
particularise H0 in the situation s, and relate particular actions with the utterance under 
study (an aspect of van Eemeren’s contextualization). 
It is important to remind that H0 and the different hS are not facts about the world 
but hypotheses: they do not characterise the way things are but rather the way things are 
conceived of in our rationality. 
b) The non materiality hypothesis 
                                                        
4
 That is, the conception an educated person could have about semantics without having learnt and reflected 
about it previously… This is, it must be admitted, the conception held by many people who speak or write 
about language! 
 Let us suppose that ETI shares with us the aspects of our contemporary occidental 
rationality expressed by H0. This would not prevent it from believing that the way John’s 
utterance caused Paul’s action is that the vibrations emitted by John during his utterance 
physically caused Paul to get up and close the window. Though it hurts our contemporary 
occidental rationality, this idea is not absurd: the fact that we simply cannot take it 
seriously does not make it false
5
. Moreover, utterances do have observable physical 
effects: a loud voice can hurt the hearers’ ears, specific frequencies can break crystal, etc. 
What our rationality cannot accept is the idea that the linguistic effects of the utterances 
could be reduced to material causality. In order to rule out this idea, we need another 
hypothesis, which is also characteristic of our rationality rather than of the state of the 
world: 
H1: The linguistic effects of an utterance are not due to material causes 
As a consequence of H1, if we cannot believe that the observable actions caused by an 
utterance are due to its materiality, we are bound to admit that they are due to its form. In 
our rationality, the causal attribution requested by H0 is constrained to be a formal 
causality. 
c) The non immediateness hypothesis 
If we use the term sentence to refer to a category of form of utterances, we start to 
be in the position to fill the gap between what we can observe (utterances and behaviours) 
and what we want semantics to talk about (sentences and meanings). However, there is 
yet another option that our rationality compels us to rule out: ETI could accept H1 and yet 
believe that though the causality that links John’s utterance to Paul’s action is not 
material, it directly determined Paul’s action. That is, one could believe that John’s 
utterance directly caused Paul to close the window, without leaving him room for a 
choice. This sort of belief corresponds to what we can call a ‘magic thinking’; indeed, in 
Ali Baba’s tail, for instance, there would be no magic if the “sesame” formula were 
recognised by a captor which would send an “open” instruction to a mechanism 
conceived in such a way that it could open the cave. The magical effect is due to the 
directedness of the effect of the formula. It is interesting to note that this feature of our 
rationality, which compels us to reject direct causality of forms, is rather recent and 
probably not completely ‘installed’ in our cognitive systems: there are many traces in 
human behaviour and in human languages of the ‘magic thinking’. From some uses of 
expressions like “Please” or “Excuse me” to greetings such as “Happy new year!”, an 
impressing series of linguistic expressions and social behaviours suggests that, though a 
part of our mind has abandoned the ‘magic thinking’, another part still lives with it. 
Think, for instance, about the effects of insults on normal contemporary human beings… 
However, for scientific purposes, we definitely abandoned the ‘magic thinking’ 
and, again, since it is a characteristic of our rationality and not a matter of knowledge 
about the world, no observation can prove that it has to be abandoned: we need another 
hypothesis, which could be stated as follows: 
H2: The directly observable effects of utterances are not directly caused by them 
                                                        
5
 Some Buddhist sects seek the “language of nature” in which the words emit the exact vibrations which 
correspond to the objects they refer to… Even though most of us, occidental thinkers, reject the belief 
underlying that quest, there is no ground to profess that the belief is silly independently of our set of beliefs. 
 The acceptance of that “anti-magic” hypothesis has at least two types of 
consequences on the conception one can have of human being.  
The first type of consequences pertains to ethics: if utterances do not directly 
cause observable effects on human actions, no human being can justify a reprehensible 
action arguing that they have been told or even ordered to accomplish them. If a war 
criminal tries to do so, he or she will give the justified impression that he or she is not 
behaving like a human being, but rather like a kind of animal or robot. As human beings, 
we are supposed to be responsible for our actions; which does not mean that we are free, 
since a reprehensible decision could be the only way of serving vital interests. Though 
this type of consequences of H2 are serious and important, they do not directly belong to 
the subject matter of this paper and we will have to end the discussion here. However, we 
think they were worth mentioning… 
The second type of consequences of H2 concern the relationship between 
semantics and cognitive science. Indeed, H2, combined with H0 and H1, can be seen as a 
way of setting the foundations of a science of human cognition and of picturing its 
relationship with related disciplines. If we admit, in agreement with H0, H1 and H2, that 
an utterance may indirectly and non materially causes an action, we are bound to accept 
the existence of a non physical causal chain linking the utterance to the action, part of that 
chain being inaccessible to our sensorial apparatus. The object of semantics is the first 
link of the chain; the first internal state can be seen as the utterance meaning. The action 
is determined by a causal lattice in which the utterance meaning is a part, and which 
includes many other elements and links; none of these elements or links are directly 
observable, though indirect observation can suggest more or less plausible hypotheses 
about them. Different theoretical frameworks in cognitive science construe that causal 
lattice in different ways; they also use the variations of different observable parameters in 
order to form these hypotheses. In our example, the only two directly observable 
parameters were utterances and actions, for the part of the lattice that we are interested in 
is the chain that links utterances to actions. However, other kinds of cognitive science 
experiments could be interested in studying the variations of other directly observable 
parameters, such as electrical excitation, visual input, outside temperature, etc. for the 
beginning of the chain and movement characteristics, body temperature, attention, etc. for 
the end of the chain
6
. 
Note that the fact that cognitive science and semantics may share experimental 
devices is not sufficient to adhere to the present fashion and suggest that there can be a 
“cognitive semantics”: the object of semantics (the link between utterances and utterance 
meanings, as it is inscribed in languages units) does not belong to the causal lattice which 
constitutes the object of cognitive science
7
. 
 
 
3. STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING, HUMAN LANGUAGES & ARGUMENTATION 
 
From the necessity of devising experiments providing indirect observation for semantics, 
as analyzed above, many consequences follow, from many different points of view. For 
the purpose of this paper, I would like to insist on two of them, which are related to the 
                                                        
6
 I obviously didn’t choose realistic nor very interesting parameters… but my purpose is only illustrative. 
7
 See Raccah (2011) for more about this subject. 
 connection between strategic manoeuvring and semantic approaches to argumentation: 
namely the essential role of discourses analysis, and the essential insufficiency of 
ordinary corpora. 
 
3.1. The essential role of discourses analysis in semantics 
 
As acknowledged by the pragma-dialectical approach to strategic manoeuvring, most, if 
not all, of what we know about results, routes, constraints and commitments involved in 
the that is carried out by making an argumentative move, we know it through the 
interpretation of texts or discourses. It follows that, if we don’t use an empirically 
grounded formal model in order to account for how this knowledge is built out of these 
texts and discourses, the essential knowledge used for describing argumentative strategies 
will remain intuitive. 
In order to account for how this knowledge is built, out of the interpretation of 
texts and discourses, the semantic models that can be used must enable to describe how 
languages units impose the construction of the particular senses (utterance meanings), in 
the situations in which they are uttered, senses which constitute the different pieces of 
that knowledge. And, in order to allow such descriptions, the language units have to 
crystallize some aspects of the socialized world which constitute the institutional 
situation. Diagram 2 illustrates this point. 
 
 
Diagram 2: from situations and language units to knowledge concerning strategic manoeuvring 
 
3.2 About corpora 
 
The second consequence of this causal study which I would like to emphasize concerns 
the kind of corpora that can be useful for an empirical study of strategic maneuvering 
through semantics. The requirements for such corpora are limited to the ones for semantic 
corpora, since any discourse and any text refers to the institutional constraints on its own 
interpretation. However, these ‘limited’ requirements that must meet a corpus in order to 
be usable for an empirical study of semantics are not so weak and, actually, are very 
seldom met in the corpora used in the literature. 
Indeed, ordinary corpora provide only (in the best cases) one half of the empirical 
data required to study semantics: they usually only provide the linguistic units that have 
 been used (the signifier), but do not give cues for the utterance meanings that have bean 
actually constructed in the real situation in which they have been used. This leaves the 
second half of the necessary data to the observer’s intuition. The fact that observer’s 
intuitions are usually rather good does not help: on the contrary, it makes the observer 
rely on these intuitions without even noticing it. In order to illustrate this point, one only 
needs to imagine a physicist’s reaction to another physicist claiming “I know where the 
cannon ball will fall, so I don’t have to tire myself to examine what is happening in the 
field”… 
Obviously, the actual interpretation that a reader or a hearer made in the actual 
situation in which those linguistic units were used (like any interpretation whatsoever) is 
not accessible through our sensorial apparatus. Therefore, no corpus could possibly 
provide it. However, it is the burden of the observers to justify the interpretations they 
assign to those texts and discourse. Again, indirect observation is necessary: a useful 
corpus for semantics should contain cues for assessing the correctness or, at least, the 
plausibility of hypotheses on what has been understood. 
 
 
4. PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS, AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
I will conclude underlining some of the consequences of the ambition to use semantics in 
order to more formally and more empirically access institutional knowledge within the 
study of strategic manoeuvring. 
In this study, we saw that, if we want to take seriously the findings of the pragma-
dialectical approach to strategic manoeuvring, we must be in the position to take into 
account the institutional preconditions prevailing in the communicative practice, 
preconditions which can be observed mainly through discourses and texts. For that 
reason, we must be able to, so to speak, extract those preconditions out of these 
discourses and texts, as rigorously as possible; in particular, in order to limit the role of 
intuition, we need a semantic model which can determine the contribution of language 
units to the assessment of those preconditions. 
Neither cognitive semantics nor truth-conditional semantics can do the job 
because the descriptions they provide have nothing to do with socialized ways of 
understanding the institutions: what is needed is an instructional semantics that accounts 
for how the languages units influence the hearer’s ways of seeing the role of institutions, 
or, from a complementary point of view, how the languages units reveal the speakers’ 
ways of understanding the impact of institutions. As a consequence, what is needed is a 
semantics that assigns socialized points of view to language units, constraints on points of 
view to connectors and operators, in order to allow to compute the points of view 
suggested by more complex language units. Given that causal relations are not observable 
though our sensorial apparatus, particular attention must be paid to the refutability of 
each observational statement. Moreover, given that the interpretation that was actually 
built out of a discourse or a text is not directly accessible to observation, particular 
attention must also be paid to the justification of the interpretation assigned to the triple 
<language unit, situation, addressee>. 
Such semantic models, called ViewPoint Semantics (VPS), have been developed 
and are mainly used to extract knowledge and/or ideologies from texts and discourses. 
 Their use for assessing institutional preconditions prevailing in the communicative 
practice, in order to study strategic manoeuvring, is promising, from a practical point of 
view, and inspiring, from a theoretical point of view. 
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